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A classic question in international economics is whether it is better to use the exchange rate or the
money growth rate as the instrument of monetary policy. A common argument is that the exchange
rate has a natural advantage since exchange rates provide signals of policymakers’ actions that are
easier to monitor than those provided by money growth rates. We formalize this argument in a
simple model in which the government chooses which instrument it will use to target inﬂation. In
it, the exchange rate is more transparent than the money growth rate in that the exchange rate is
easier for the public to monitor. We ﬁnd that the greater transparency of the exchange rate regime
makes it easier to provide the central bank with incentives to pursue good policies and hence gives
this regime a natural advantage over the money regime.
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System.“by the simple virtue of being a price rather than a quantity, the exchange rate
provides a much clearer signal to the public of the government’s intentions and
actual actions than a money supply target. Thus, if the public’s inﬂationary
expectations are inﬂuenced to a large extent by the ability to easily track and
continuously monitor the nominal anchor, the exchange rate has a natural advan-
tage.” Calvo and Vegh (1999 p. 1589)
“True, the exchange rate has some special properties. In particular, it is easily
observable, so the private sector can directly monitor any broken promises by the
central bank. But we know of no convincing argument that turns these proper-
ties into an explanation for why it would be a more eﬃcient method to achieve
credibility to target the exchange rate rather than, say, the money growth rate.”
(Persson and Tabellini 1994. p17)
A classic question in international economics is whether it is better to use exchange
rates or money growth rates as the instrument of monetary policy. A common argument,
illustrated by the quote of Calvo and Vegh, is that the exchange rate has a natural advantage
over the money growth rate as an instrument since the exchange rate provides a signal of
policymakers’ actions that is easier to monitor than that provided by money growth rates.
Skeptics of this view, such as Persson and Tabellini, agree that the exchange rate is easier
for the public to monitor than money growth. They argue, however, that no clear theoretical
argument has been given that turns this property of exchange rates into a rationale for why
the exchange rate has a natural advantage as an instrument. This paper provides such a
theoretical argument.We formalize this argument using a simple model of sustainable monetary policy simi-
lar to that in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In it, each period,
the central bank chooses one of two regimes for monetary policy: one in which the exchange
rate is the instrument or one in which money growth is the instrument. Under the exchange-
rate regime, the central bank picks an exchange rate with some foreign country, and realized
domestic inﬂation varies with shocks to the inﬂation rate in the foreign country. Thus, by
choosing an exchange rate the central bank sets the mean inﬂation rate and realized inﬂation
varies with foreign inﬂation shocks. Under the money regime the central bank picks a money
growth rate, thus setting the mean inﬂation rate, and realized inﬂation varies with domestic
inﬂation shocks. Hence under both regimes the central banks sets the mean inﬂation rate
and the realized inﬂation varies with exogenous shocks.
The key diﬀerence between the two regimes is in their transparency. The exchange-
rate regime is transparent in that private agents can directly observe the exchange rate. The
money regime is opaque in that private agents cannot directly observe money growth rates,
but rather they only observe inﬂation which serves as a noisy signal of money growth. In all
other respects, the two regimes are symmetric. Note that in both regimes the government is
targeting inﬂation, it is just using diﬀerent instruments to implement its target.
Exchange-rate regimes gain an advantage from their transparency only because this
transparency helps mitigate credibility problems. To emphasize this point we ﬁrst consider
an environment in which the central bank can commit to its policies and hence has no
credibility problems. In evaluating regimes we compare the best equilibrium of both regimes.
Here, even though exchange rates are easier to monitor, exchange-rate regimes have no natural
advantage: an exchange-rate regime is preferred to a money regime if and only if the volatility
2of foreign inﬂation shocks is smaller than that of domestic inﬂation shocks.
We then consider an environment in which the central bank cannot commit to its
policies. Under either regime the central bank has credibility problems in that it has an
incentive in the short run to surprise the public with higher than expected inﬂation. In
equilibrium, this short-run incentive is balanced against the costs that arise when private
agents adjust their expectations of future policies and hence their future actions when they
perceive a deviation by the central bank.
In the environment without commitment, the exchange-rate regime has a natural
advantage because of its transparency in the sense that when the volatilities of foreign and
domestic shocks are equal the exchange-rate regime is strictly preferred. Under the exchange-
rate regime private agents can detect any deviation by the central bank from its expected
action with certainty and thus they can adjust their actions precisely when a deviation occurs.
Under the money regime, private agents can only respond to inﬂation, which is a noisy signal
of the central bank’s action and thus their response to a deviation by the central bank must
necessarily be less precise. It is this inability of private agents to precisely tailor their behavior
in response to deviations by the central bank that makes it more diﬃcult to deter the central
bank from surprise inﬂation in the money regime. This inability gives the exchange-rate
regime its natural advantage.
We also characterize the outcomes that occur in the best exchange-rate regime and
the best money regime. In the environment with commitment the outcomes are symmetric
in the two regimes. In both the government chooses a single level for either the exchange rate
or the money growth rate and it implements this level in every period.
In the environment without commitment the outcomes under the two regimes are very
3diﬀerent. In the best equilibrium under an exchange-rate regime, the central bank chooses
a low rate of depreciation of the exchange rate designed to achieve a low average inﬂation
rate. It maintains this low rate in every period, regardless of the realization of inﬂation.
This policy is sustained by the fear that if the central bank were ever to deviate from this
exchange rate path, private agents would treat this deviation as a signal that the government
was going to implement the highest sustainable inﬂation rate in the next period and, hence,
set the growth in wages to a correspondingly high level.
The equilibrium outcome under the best money regime looks very diﬀerent. Under a
money regime, agents cannot distinguish whether high realized inﬂation was the result of the
central bank’s choice of a high money growth rate or simply the result of a large domestic
inﬂation shock. As a result of this lack of transparency, the outcome necessarily oscillates
at random between two extreme phases, the ﬁrst with low average inﬂation and the second
with high average inﬂation. This random switching between phases of low and high average
inﬂation along the equilibrium path in the best money regime is analogous to the outcomes
obtained by Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986) in their
analysis of equilibrium price wars among oligopolists.
In terms of the literature on monetary policy, our analysis is most related to the
seminal contribution of Canzoneri (1985), who was the ﬁrst to use the logic of Green and
Porter (1984) to explain periodic bouts of high inﬂation. (See also Zarazaga 1993.) There is
also some work in this literature on the issue of transparency in monetary policy. Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986) and Faust and Svensson (1998, 1999) explore linear signalling outcomes
in models with unobserved types.
In terms of international economics literature, the most related work is by Canavan
4and Tommasi (1997) and Herrendorf (1999), who use two-period signalling games to argue
that governments can signal their preferences for low inﬂation by choosing an exchange rate
rather than a money growth rate. For related work in a domestic context see Backus and
Driﬃll (1985).
Here we have used a simple reduced-form model of money. Chang (1998), Phelan and
Stacchetti (1999), and Albanesi, Chari and Christiano (2001) have used the recursive methods
of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) to analyze some general equilibrium macroeconomic
models with perfect monitoring.
1. Policy instruments: exchange rates vs. money growth rates
Here we present a model of monetary policy in which, each period, the government
selects either an exchange-rate regime, in which it uses the exchange rate as its policy instru-
ment or a money regime, in which it uses the money growth rate as its policy instrument.
The model extends the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
Time is discrete and denoted t =0 ,1,2,....There is a central bank referred to as a
government, which dislikes unemployment and inﬂation, and a continuum of agents who each
c h o o s et h er a t eo fc h a n g eo ft h e i rn o m i n a lw a g e .
The timing of actions within each period is as follows. The government chooses the
regime at the beginning of the period, namely, whether to use the exchange rate or money
growth as its instrument of monetary policy. Under the exchange-rate regime, the government
opens a trading desk at which it trades domestic and foreign currency. Under the money
regime the government does not open this desk. The presence or absence of the trading desk
is an observable indicator of the current monetary regime. Agents then choose their nominal
5wages. Finally, depending on the regime, the government chooses the level of either the
exchange rate or money growth. The government is free to switch regimes at the beginning
of the next period.
It is convenient to describe the economy for a given period t starting at the end of
the period and working backward to the beginning. At the end the period, the government
chooses the level of either the exchange rate or the money growth rate. The government takes
as given the average rate of wage inﬂation x set by agents earlier in the period. Unemployment
i se q u a lt oac o n s t a n tU plus the gap between wage inﬂation and realized inﬂation π. The










Realized inﬂation is a function of monetary policy as follows. Under the exchange-rate
regime, the government chooses a rate of change in the exchange rate denoted et = st −st−1.
For simplicity we refer to et as the exchange rate. The choice of the exchange rate et is
observed. Inﬂation in the home country is given by
π = e + π
∗ (2)
where π∗ is inﬂation in the foreign country, which is normal with mean 0 and variance σ2
π∗.
Thus, by choosing an exchange rate the government sets the mean inﬂation rate to be e, and
the variance of domestic inﬂation is determined by shocks in the foreign country outside of
its control. Foreign inﬂation π∗ is observed only after the exchange rate is chosen. We let
g(π|e) denote the density of realized inﬂation at home given the choice of exchange rate e.
Under the money regime, the government chooses a money growth rate µ. Given µ,
6inﬂation π is given by
π = µ + ε (3)
where ε are domestic shocks distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ2
π.T h u s , b y
choosing the money growth rate the government sets the mean inﬂation rate to be µ, and the
variance of domestic inﬂation is determined by domestic shocks outside of the government’s
control. We can think of the imperfect connection between money growth and inﬂation as
arising from some combination of imperfect control over actual (as opposed to desired) money
growth and a noisy relation between money growth and inﬂation. We let f(π|µ) denote the
density of realized inﬂation given the choice of money growth rate µ. We call σ2
π the variance
of domestic inﬂation shocks.
To model the idea that exchange rates are more easily monitored than money growth
rates, we assume that under both regimes agents can see the exchange rate and the inﬂation
rate but they cannot observe the money growth rate. Thus, under an exchange-rate regime
agents directly see the actions of the government, namely, e, while under the money regime
they do not.
Under both regimes (2) and (3) hold. In the exchange-rate regime e is the choice
variable and money growth is endogenously determined, while in the money regime µ is the
choice variable and e is endogenously determined. In these regimes the government’s choice
of either e or µ determines the mean inﬂation rate. The only diﬀerence in the regimes, besides
observability of the instruments, is the variance of the resulting inﬂation. In this sense, in
both regimes the government is targeting the mean rate of inﬂation.































Notice that the government payoﬀs in the two regimes are symmetric with respect to the
policy variables e and µ. In particular, the functions S and R diﬀer only with respect to the
uncontrollable variances σ2
π∗ and σ2
π which are constants. For technical reasons we assume
that the policies e and µ are bounded above and below by some arbitrarily large constants.
These bounds ensure that the government payoﬀs are bounded.
In the middle of the period, each agent chooses the change in his wage rate zt =
wt − wt−1.W e l e t xt d e n o t et h ea v e r a g ec h a n g ei nt h ew a g er a t ei np e r i o dt,w h i c h ,f o r
simplicity, we refer to as average wages. An agent’s payoﬀ for a given value of z and a











Each agent can choose z diﬀerently depending on whether the regime is an exchange-rate
regime or a money regime. We denote these choices ze and zµ. An agent’s expected payoﬀ
































Notice that, under either regime, agents aim to choose wages equal to mean inﬂation, either
e or µ depending on the regime.
Notice also that the objective function of agents diﬀers from that of the government. In
our simple reduced-form model this diﬀerence generates the conﬂict of interests between the
government and the agents that leads to a time consistency problem. We think of this setup
as a reduced-form way of capturing the tension that occurs in a general equilibrium model
in which the government and the agents share the same objectives but there are distortions
in the economy. (See Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott 1989 for a more complete discussion.)





t[(1 − it)S(xet,e t)+itR(xµt,µ t)] (9)
where 1 ≥ β > 0 is the discount factor and it is an indicator variable that denotes the regime
chosen in period t, where it =0if the exchange-rate regime is chosen and it =1if the money
regime is chosen. Here xet denotes the wages chosen in period t if the exchange-rate regime
is chosen and xµt denotes the wages chosen in period t if the money regime is chosen. The
discounted payoﬀs for the agents are written in a similar manner.
2. An environment with commitment
Here we suppose that the government can commit to a policy once-and-for-all in pe-
riod 0. We show that with commitment the classic result holds: an exchange-rate regime is
9preferred if and only if the volatility of foreign inﬂation shocks is smaller than that of domes-
tic inﬂation shocks. Thus, for this environment, the exchange rate has no natural advantage
as an instrument even though it is more easily monitored.
In this environment, at the beginning of period 0, the government chooses the sequence
{it,e t,µ t}∞
t=0 i n d i c a t i n gt h er e g i m ei tw i l lf o l l o wa n dt h ee x c h a n g er a t eo rm o n e yg r o w t hr a t e
that it will implement under that regime in each period. After this, in each period t, agents
choose wages zet or zµt depending on the regime. Given (7) and (8), it is clearly optimal for
agents to choose zet = et and zµt = µt, and hence average wages satisfy
xet = et and xµt = µt. (10)
It should be clear that here the optimal policies and allocations solve the Ramsey prob-
lem of choosing {it,e t,µ t,x et,x µt}∞
t=0 to maximize (9) subject to (10). This problem reduces
to a sequence of static problems of choosing e and µ to solve maxeS(e,e) and maxµ R(µ,µ)
and then choosing the regime that leads to the higher value. Since the government payoﬀs
are symmetric with respect to the policy variables, the optimal exchange rate and money
growth rate are identical (both 0) and the government simply picks the regime with the lower
variance of inﬂation. We denote this maximum payoﬀ as vR and refer to it as the Ramsey
payoﬀ. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 1. (No natural advantage with commitment) Under commitment the
exchange-rate regime is preferred to the money regime if and only if σ2
π∗ ≤ σ2
π .
3. An environment without commitment
Here we suppose that the government cannot commit. Instead, in each period it
chooses the regime and then, after agents set wages, it chooses the level of its policy instru-
10ment. We show that without commitment the exchange-rate regime has a natural advantage
because of its transparency.
In this environment both the government and private agents choose their actions as
functions of the observed history of aggregate variables: the choice of regime, the exchange
rate and inﬂation. In period t this history is given by ht =( i0,e 0,π0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1). A
strategy for government is a sequence of functions σG = {it(ht),e t(ht),µ t(ht)} which map
histories into the choice of regime it and corresponding money growth rates µt or exchange
rates et. A strategy for agents is a sequence of functions σA = {zet (ht),z µt(ht)}
∞
t=0 which
map histories into actions zt, where zet(ht) is only relevant if it(ht)=0and zµt(ht) is only
relevant if it(ht)=1 . We also deﬁne a sequence of functions σX = {xet (ht),x µt(ht)}
∞
t=0 which
record the average wages chosen by agents after each history. Let σ =( σG,σA,σX) denote the
strategies of the government and agents and the average wages. Notice that in the histories
we need not record the past averages of the actions of agents since a deviation by any one
agent cannot aﬀect this average. (See, for example, Chari and Kehoe 1990 for details.)
A perfect equilibrium in this environment is a collection of strategies σ such that i)
after every history ht, the private agents’ strategy σA is optimal given the government’s
strategy σG and the average of other private agents’ wages σX, and ii) after every history ht,
the government’s strategy σG is optimal given the average of private agents’ strategies σX.
Let V denote the set of equilibrium payoﬀs. In what follows it will prove convenient
to allow public randomization to guarantee that this set V is convex and thus equal to an
interval [vw,vb] where vw is the lowest or the worst equilibrium payoﬀ and vb is the highest
or the best equilibrium payoﬀ. This public randomization is accomplished by adding to the
model a random variable θt that the agents and the government observe at the beginning
11of each period. We modify the histories ht to include the realizations of this variable from
period 0 through period t.
It should be clear given our functional forms (7) and (8), that, given a government
strategy σG, after any history ht, it is optimal for private agents to choose wages zet(ht)=
et(ht) and zµt(ht)=µt(ht). Thus, in any perfect equilibrium, average wages must satisfy
xet(ht)=et(ht) and xµt(ht)=µt(ht).
That is, wage inﬂation must equal expected inﬂation.
We formulate the incentive constraint of the government recursively by drawing on
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). Their basic idea is as follows. In a repeated game
a strategy is a prescription for current actions and all future actions. When evaluating the
government’s current payoﬀs and current incentive constraints, however, we need not specify
the whole sequence of future actions following every possible current action; rather, we need
specify only how the government’s payoﬀ from next period on, namely, its continuation value,
will vary as its current action varies. In a perfect equilibrium these continuation values are
also equilibrium payoﬀs for the repeated game starting from next period on. This simple
observation forms the basis for a recursive approach for describing the incentive compatibility
constraints for the government and to ﬁnding the set of equilibrium payoﬀs.
Consider a period in which the government has chosen an exchange-rate regime and
agents have chosen wages xe. We can formulate the current incentive constraint on the gov-
ernment’s choice of exchange rate e recursively as follows. What matters to the government
in choosing the exchange rate is how its current period payoﬀ and its continuation value
vary with its action e. Its current period payoﬀ is (1 − β)S(xe,e), where the agents’ choice
12of xe is taken as given. Since agents observe the government’s choice of exchange rate e,
their future choices of wages, and thus the future payoﬀs of the government, can vary with e
directly. Rather than describe the entire sequence of future actions taken by private agents
and the government, contingent on the government’s current choice of e, we simply describe
the government’s continuation payoﬀ from those actions as some function w(e). Since, in a
perfect equilibrium, the strategies that private agents and the government follow from next
period on must also be perfect equilibrium strategies of the repeated game starting from that
period, the government’s continuation values w(e) must lie in the set V of perfect equilibrium
payoﬀs for the government. Given any such continuation value function w(e) ∈ V, we say
that an exchange rate e is incentive compatible in the current period if
(1 − β)S(xe,e)+βw(e) ≥ (1 − β)S(xe,e
0)+βw(e
0) (11)
for all e0. This constraint simply requires that the government get a higher discounted sum
of current and future payoﬀsf r o mc h o o s i n ge than it does from choosing any other e0. It is a
standard result that such a recursive incentive constraint is necessary and suﬃcient for full
incentive compatibility.
Consider next a period in which the government has chosen a money regime and agents
have chosen wages xµ. We can formulate the current incentive constraint on the government’s
choice of money growth rate µ recursively as well. This constraint is diﬀerent from the
constraint (11) above because, here, agents do not observe the government’s action, here the
money growth rate µ, but rather inﬂation π = µ + ε, which is a noisy signal of µ. Hence the
government’s continuation value cannot vary with µ directly, but rather it can vary only with
π. Thus we write the continuation value function for the government in this case as w(π).
13These continuation values w(π) must also lie in the set V of perfect equilibrium payoﬀso f
the government.
Given any such continuation value function w(π) ∈ V, we say that a money growth
rate µ is incentive compatible in the current period if
(1 − β)R(xµ,µ)+β
Z





for any possible µ0. This constraint simply requires that the government get a higher payoﬀ
from this period on from choosing µ than it does from choosing any other µ0. Notice that
here the government’s continuation payoﬀsv a r yw i t hµ only to the extent that changes in
the money growth rate µ shift the distribution of inﬂation π.
Notice that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs V is independent of which regime is used in
t h ec u r r e n tp e r i o d .T h i si sb e c a u s ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ns w i t c hr e g i m e s
at the beginning of any period and, hence, the game from next period on is independent of
the regime used in the current period. Also note that the set V in which the government’s
continuation values w(e) must lie is unknown. We can solve for this set recursively. To show
that an exchange-rate regime has a natural advantage, however, we do not need to solve for
V. Instead, we treat this set V =[ vw,vb] as a parameter and show that an exchange-rate
regime has a natural advantage from transparency for any nondegenerate equilibrium set V .
We compare the exchange-rate regime to the money regime as follows. We ﬁrst com-
pute the highest payoﬀ that can be achieved if the exchange-rate regime is used in the current
period, and both the level of e and xe and the continuation value function w(e) are chosen
to maximize the payoﬀ of the government subject to the incentive constraints. This payoﬀ is
the highest perfect equilibrium payoﬀ for the government given that it uses an exchange-rate
14regime in the current period and is free to switch regimes in each future period. We then
compute the corresponding highest payoﬀ for the government given that it uses a money
regime in the current period and is free to switch regimes in each future period. We compare
these payoﬀs to characterize when the exchange-rate regime is preferred to the money regime.
Given a set V =[ vw,vb] of perfect equilibrium payoﬀs, the best payoﬀ for the govern-
ment under an exchange-rate regime is the solution to the following problem: choose current
actions xe and e and continuation value function w(e) ∈ V to maximize
(1 − β)S(xe,e)+βw(e)
subject to the incentive constraints xe = e and (11). Notice that the left-side of the incentive
constraint (11) is the payoﬀ to be maximized, so it is clearly optimal to set w(e)=vb. To
relax the incentive constraint (11) as much as possible it is clearly optimal to set w(e0)=vw
so as to minimize the right-side of this constraint . Using this argument and substituting out
xe = e we can write this problem as
max








Given a set V =[ vw,vb] of perfect equilibrium payoﬀs, the best payoﬀ for the govern-
ment under a money regime is the solution to the following problem: choose current actions




15subject to the incentive constraints xµ = µ and (12). Substituting xµ = µ and rearranging
the incentive constraint we can write this problem as
max









We begin with a preliminary result that we use in establishing Proposition 2.
Lemma 1.( V nondegenerate) If the variance of foreign inﬂa t i o ns h o c k si sl e s st h a no r
equal to that of domestic inﬂation shocks, the set V =[ vw,vb] has vb >v w and vb is greater
than payoﬀ from the static Nash outcome repeated in every period.
We then have the following.
Proposition 2. (A natural advantage without commitment) When there is no com-
mitment, the exchange-rate regime is preferred to the money regime even if the variances of
foreign and domestic inﬂation shocks are the same.
Proof.W h e n σ2
π∗ = σ2
π , the current period payoﬀsa r et h es a m ei nt h a tS(µ,µ0)=
R(µ,µ0). Clearly, the exchange-rate regime is weakly preferred to the money regime. To show
that the exchange-rate regime is strictly preferred we proceed as follows. The continuation
value for the government under the money regime is lower than it is under the exchange-rate




Suppose ﬁrst that w(π) is such that (18) is an equality. Then w(π)=vb (almost
everywhere), the government’s continuation payoﬀ is independent of its current action and
16the only incentive compatible actions under a money regime are the static Nash actions. From
Lemma 1 we know that the government can achieve a payoﬀ that is strictly higher than that
of static Nash with an exchange-rate regime. Hence, if (18) is an equality, an exchange-rate
regime is strictly preferred to a money regime.
Next, suppose that w(π) is such that (18) is a strict inequality. Note that the incentive






As a result, here also, the best payoﬀ the government can achieve under an exchange-rate
regime is strictly higher than the best payoﬀ it can achieve under a money regime. Q.E.D.
We illustrate the results of Propositions 1 and 2 in Figure 1. In the ﬁgure we show
how the optimal regime varies with the variances of domestic and foreign inﬂation shocks.
When there is commitment, the exchange-rate regime is preferred if and only if the variance
of foreign inﬂation shocks, σ2
π∗, is lower than the variance of domestic shocks, σ2
π. This is
the region labelled A in the ﬁgure. When there is no commitment, the exchange-rate regime
i sp r e f e r r e de v e ni ft h ev a r i a n c e so ft h es h o c k sa r ee q u a l . T h u s ,t h er e g i o nf o rw h i c ht h e
exchange-rate regime is preferred expands to include the region labelled B as well as A.
4. Alternative models of transparency
In modelling the idea that exchange rates are easier to monitor than money growth
r a t e sw eh a v em a d et h es i m p l eb u te x t r e m ea s s u m p t i o n st h a ti n ﬂation is the only signal of
the money growth rate and that money growth rates are never observed. Here we show that
we can relax these assumptions and still obtain our main result.
17Suppose ﬁrst that, in addition to inﬂation, there is a direct noisy signal of money
growth. Speciﬁcally, we add a direct signal of money growth η to the model. Let f(π,η|µ)
be the density of inﬂation π and the noisy signal η given the money growth µ. Here the
government’s continuation value can vary only with π and η a n dc a nb ew r i t t e na sw(π,η).








for any possible µ0. It should be clear that it is easy to prove the analogue of Proposition 2.
in this environment.
Suppose next that inﬂation is the only signal but that the money growth rate is
perfectly observable with a lag. Speciﬁcally, we modify our model by letting money growth
become known with a one-period lag. Here, the history for the private agents is
ht =( i0,e 0,π0;i1,e 1,π1,µ 0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1,µ t−2)
Thus, the money growth µt−1 only is observed after private agents set their wages in period
t. The history for the government is
Ht =( i0,e 0,π0,µ 0;i1,e 1,π1,µ 0;...;it−1,e t−1,πt−1,µ t−1).









so that the best equilibrium payoﬀ to the game with no commitment is strictly less than the
Ramsey payoﬀ.
18The intuition of why exchange rates have a natural advantage in this environment is
clear. Under the money regime any deviation in period t is not directly observed in that
period. Thus, in period t +1the private agents can react only to a noisy signal of that
action. Of course, in period t +2agents have observed the government’s action in period
t and agents at that time can precisely react to any deviation in period t.T h i s l a g i n t h e
ability to precisely react leads to a tighter incentive constraint under the money regime and
thus gives the exchange rate regime its advantage.
The technical diﬃculty in proving this result is that this game does not lend itself
to recursive analysis as easily as our original game. In our original game both the private
agents and the governments have the same information at the beginning of each period, hence
the game starting from any period t looks identical to the game starting in period 0. In the
game with information lags, in the game starting from period t the government has private
information, namely its actions in period t − 1 that the private agents do not have. In the
game starting in period 0, however, the government has no private information. Hence, when
there are lags the game starting at time t does not look identical to the game starting in
period 0.
We can prove the analog of Proposition 2 in this environment, however, without using
recursive analysis. We prove this in three steps. The ﬁrst step is to show that in any period the
government’s continuation payoﬀ can never be lower than the payoﬀ to the worst equilibrium
payoﬀ vw starting from time 0. This follows because each period the government always has
the option of not conditioning its action on what it has done in the past. So, therefore,
t h eg o v e r n m e n tc a n n o tb eh e l dt op a y o ﬀs lower than it can attain at date 0 when there is
no past on which to condition. Thus, the punishment following a money regime, when the
19government has private information, can never be worse than that following an exchange rate
regime, when it does not.
The second step is the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If the variance of foreign and domestic inﬂation shocks is the same, then,
for any equilibrium strategy proﬁle σ that starts in the ﬁrst period with a money regime,
there exists an alternative equilibrium strategy proﬁle ˜ σ that starts in the ﬁrst period with
an exchange rate regime and which delivers the same payoﬀ for the government.
Proof. The current period payoﬀ functions R(xµ,µ) and S(xe,e) are identical and
the distribution of realized inﬂation π is also identical whenever e = µ and xe = xµ. The
alternative equilibrium strategy proﬁle ˜ σ is constructed by having the government choose an
exchange rate regime in the ﬁrst period, private agents setting wages xe = xµ, government
choosing e0 = µ0, and, in subsequent periods having agents’ and the government’s actions
vary with realized inﬂation π0 in exactly the same way that these actions varied with π0 under
the original strategy proﬁle σ. The more subtle part is that if the government deviates under
a money regime this deviation can be detected only statistically, while if it deviates under
an exchange rate regime this deviation is detected for sure. Following such a deviation with
e0 6= µ0, under ˜ σ instead of using whatever punishment would have happened in the money
regime we instead use the worst possible punishment, namely a strategy proﬁle that delivers
the payoﬀ vw for the government. From Lemma 1 above, we know that this punishment for
deviations e0 = µ0 is (weakly) more severe than any punishment for deviations speciﬁed in
σ, and hence, ˜ σ must also be incentive compatible.
The third step ﬁnishes the proof as follows.
Proposition 3. If vb is strictly less than the Ramsey payoﬀ and the variance of the
20domestic and foreign inﬂation shocks are equal, then an exchange rate regime is strictly
preferred to a money regime.
Proof: Let σ be an equilibrium strategy proﬁle in which the government chooses a
money regime in period 0. By Lemma 2, we can construct an alternative equilibrium in
which the government chooses an exchange rate regime and attains the same value. We now
show that by choosing an exchange rate regime we can relax the period 0 incentive constraint
for the government and thus attain a strictly higher payoﬀ. This completes the proof since,
under the assumption that it is infeasible to attain the Ramsey payoﬀ, the incentive constraint
strictly binds in any money regime.
Given any value of realized inﬂa t i o ni np e r i o d0 a n da n ym o n e yg r o w t hi np e r i o d0,
the government’s continuation payoﬀ from period 1on lies between vw and vb. Since private
agents’ actions in period 1 cannot be contingent on µ0 but rather must depend on realized
inﬂation, the cost to the government of a deviation period 0 in terms of the change in the
expected continuation value must be strictly less than vb−vw. In contrast, under an exchange
rate regime, there is an equilibrium in which the cost to the government after a deviation
is equal to vb − vw. Hence, the incentive constraint when an exchange rate regime is chosen
in period 0 is strictly looser than the incentive constraint when a money regime is chosen.
Thus, the best equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly higher under an exchange rate regime than it is
under a money regime. Q.E.D.
Here we have assumed that the best equilibrium has a strictly lower payoﬀ than the
Ramsey payoﬀ. Clearly, if β is high enough, then the Ramsey equilibrium can be achieved
under both regimes and the best exchange rate regime is tied with the best money regime.
215 .T h eb e s te q u i l i b r i u mw i t h o u tc o m m i t m e n t
So far we have compared the best payoﬀs the government can achieve under exchange
rate and money regimes. Here we characterize the outcomes that give rise to these best
payoﬀs.
When the exchange-rate regime is the preferred regime the equilibrium is simple. The
government chooses the exchange-rate regime in each period and sets the exchange rate equal
to eb which denotes the best exchange rate policy. If there are any deviations, agents and
the governments revert to the actions that implement the worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw. These
actions may correspond either to an exchange rate regime or a money regime depending on
the variances of the shocks. In equilibrium, of course, there are no deviations and, hence, the
exchange rate is set to eb in every period. This result follows immediately from (13).
The equilibrium outcome under the best money regime looks very diﬀerent. Under
this regime the government starts oﬀ setting the money growth equal to some low growth rate
µb and continues to do so as long as low inﬂation is realized, that is, as long as the domestic
inﬂation shocks ε are small enough so that µb + ε ≤ πb. When a suﬃciently large domestic
inﬂation shock occurs, agents and the government revert to the actions that implement the
worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw. We prove this result in Proposition 4.
It turns out that when the variances are such that a money regime implements the
best payoﬀ,t h ew o r s tp a y o ﬀ is also implemented by a money regime. In this regime the
government starts oﬀ setting the money growth equal to some high growth rate µw and
c o n t i n u e st od os oa sl o n ga sh i g hi n ﬂation is realized. When a suﬃciently small domestic
inﬂation shock occurs, agents and the government revert to the actions that implement the
best equilibrium payoﬀ. We prove this result in Proposition 6.
22These results about the nature of the best and worst money regimes are reminiscent
of those concerning equilibrium price wars in models of oligopoly discussed by Green and
Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986).
We begin by characterizing the best money regime. To do so we need to solve the
problem (15) and proceed as follows. We begin by replacing the incentive constraint (12)
by the ﬁrst-order condition associated with maximizing the left-side of this incentive con-




w(π)fµ (π|µ)dπ =0 (21)
where Rµ(x,µ)=∂R(x,µ)/∂µ and fµ(π|µ)=∂f(π|µ)/∂µ.T h i s ﬁrst-order condition is
necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that (12) holds when the function deﬁned by the left-side
of (12) is concave in µ. In Proposition 4, we simply assume that this approach is valid and
characterize the resulting w(π). In Proposition 5 we show that, given the resulting form of
w(π), the left-side of (12) is concave in µ w h e nt h ev a r i a n c eo fd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation shocks is
suﬃciently large.
Under the assumption that our ﬁrst-order condition approach is valid, in the problem
(15) we can replace the government’s incentive constraint (12) with the constraint (21). In




   
   
vb if π ≤ πb
vw if π > πb

   
   
(22)
That is, there is a cutoﬀ inﬂation level πb such that the optimal continuation value function
wb(π) is set to the best payoﬀ vb if realized inﬂation is less than πb and to the worst payoﬀ
23vw if realized inﬂation is greater than πb.
Part of the rationale for why the optimal continuation value takes the form (22) is
intuitive. Since higher money growth rates make higher inﬂation more likely, if we are to
discourage the government from choosing a high money growth rate, the continuation value
must specify a low level when the realized inﬂation is high. Slightly less intuitive is that the
best continuation value function must assign only the best and the worst possible equilibrium
payoﬀs. Mechanically, this occurs because both the payoﬀs and the incentive constraint are
linear in the continuation values. We demonstrate this formally in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Under the assumption that the ﬁrst-order condition approach is valid,
the optimal continuation value function has the form of (22).
Proof. Letting λ be the multiplier on the government’s incentive constraint (21), the











   
   
vb if (1 + λ
fµ(π|µ)
f(π|µ) ) > 0
vw if (1 + λ
fµ(π|µ)
f(π|µ) ) < 0

   
   
These ﬁrst-order conditions imply the optimal continuation values are always extreme, that
is, either vb or vw. The only issue is for what values of π are the payoﬀs vb and vw assigned. To
determine these values we start by observing that with our assumption of normality fµ(π|µ)=
f(π|µ)(π−µ)/σπ so that our densities satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property in that
fµ(π|µ)
f(π|µ)
=( π − µ)/σπ
24is increasing in π. Thus, wb(π) is increasing in π if λ > 0 and decreasing in π if λ < 0. We
will show λ < 0 so that it is decreasing in π.
Clearly, if we are to induce a low current money growth rate the continuation value
must specify a low level when the realized inﬂation is high, since higher money growth rates
make higher inﬂation more likely. We demonstrate this formally as follows. First, note that
at the optimum Rµ(xb,µ b) ≥ 0. This follows since the optimum must weakly improve upon
static Nash and thus must have a money growth rate less than or equal to the static Nash
level. That is, xb = µb ≤ U. Since Rµ(x,µ)=U+x−2µ, then µb ≤ B(xb), and Rµ(xb,µ b) ≥ 0.
Next, since Rµ(xb,µ b) ≥ 0 the incentive constraint (21) implies that
Z
w
b(π)fµ (π|µ)dπ ≤ 0. (23)
Since inﬂation is normally distributed with mean µ, increasing µ increases the distribution
of inﬂa t i o ni nt h es e n s eo fﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Thus, increasing µ increases
R
wb(π)f(π|µ)dπ when wb(π) is increasing and decreases this integral when wb(π) is decreas-
ing. Thus, to satisfy (23), wb(π) must be decreasing. Q.E.D.
In the Appendix we prove the following proposition, justifying our use of the ﬁrst-
order approach. We let φ and Φ denote the density and cumulative distribution functions of
a standard normal, respectively.
Proposition 5. (First-order approach valid) Given that wb(π) has the bang-bang form
(22) and is decreasing, if σ2
π >
β
1−β(vb − vw)φ(1)/2, then the incentive constraint (12) is
satisﬁed if and only if the ﬁrst-order condition (21) holds.
As we have noted above, when a suﬃciently large domestic inﬂation shock occurs,
agents and the government revert to the actions that implement the worst equilibrium payoﬀ
25vw. Along the equilibrium path such a shock must eventually occur, so the actions that imple-
ment the worst equilibrium payoﬀ are eventually observed. To complete our characterization
of the best money regime we must also characterize the worst equilibrium outcome.
The worst equilibrium payoﬀ vw can occur under either an exchange-rate regime or
a money regime depending on the variances of domestic and foreign inﬂation shocks. This
worst equilibrium payoﬀ is the larger of two payoﬀs: the worst payoﬀ under an exchange-rate
regime vw
e and the worst payoﬀ under a money regime vw
µ.T h a ti s ,vw =m a x {vw
e ,v w
µ}. The
worst equilibrium payoﬀ is the larger of these two payoﬀs because, at the beginning of each
period, the government can choose which regime it prefers. In the remainder of this section
we characterize the worst payoﬀs vw
e and vw
µ under the two regimes and the parameter values
for which vw = vw
e and vw = vw
µ.
Given a set V =[ vw,v b] of perfect equilibrium payoﬀs, the worst payoﬀ for the gov-
ernment under an exchange-rate regime vw
e is the solution to the following problem: choose
current actions xe and e and continuation value function w(e) ∈ V to minimize
(1 − β)S(xe,e)+βw(e)
subject to the incentive constraints xe = e and (11). To relax the constraint (11) as much
as possible, it is optimal to set w(e0)=vw for all e0 6= e so as to minimize the right-side of
this incentive constraint. Since the continuation value following a deviation is independent
of the deviation, the best deviation against e is simply the static best response B(e). Using
this argument and substituting out xe = e we can write this problem as
min
e,w (1 − β)S(e,e)+βw (24)
26subject to w ∈ [vw,v b] and
(1 − β)S(e,e)+βw ≥ (1 − β)S(e,B(e)) + βv
w (25)
for all e0.
Notice two points. First, the left-side of the constraint (25) is the objective function
that we are trying to minimize. Second, the left-side of the constraint can be made arbitrarily
s m a l lb yi n c r e a s i n ge. Hence, this constraint must bind.
Since the incentive constraint binds, we can ﬁnd the solution by minimizing the right-
side of the incentive constraint subject to (25) written as an equality. This problem is
min
e (1 − β)S(e,B(e)) + βv
w (26)
subject to vw ≤ w ≤ vb and
βw =( 1− β)[S(e,B(e) − S(e,e)] + βv
w (27)
Clearly, since S(e,B(e)) is decreasing in e, the solution involves ﬁnding the w that allows
for the largest choice of e. Given our functional forms, S(e,B(e)) − S(e,e) is increasing in e
for e greater than the static Nash level, U. Hence, the solution involves setting w = vw and
choosing e to be the largest solution to (27) with w = vw. (This result is reminiscent of a
result in Abreu 1986.)
In the worst money regime, continuation values ww(π) are assigned to give the gov-
ernment the incentive to choose a higher money growth rate than it would choose in the
static Nash outcome. This entails giving the government high continuation values in the
event that high inﬂation is realized and giving it low continuation values in the event that
low inﬂation is realized. Thus, if the worst money growth rate is realized as part of the path
27of equilibrium play, the government chooses a high money growth rate and keeps choosing
this high rate unless a suﬃciently high level of inﬂation is realized. If such a suﬃciently high
level is realized, the path of play reverts to the best equilibrium path of play, whether that
be an exchange-rate regime or a money regime. In this sense, in the worst money regime,
extremely high inﬂation must be realized before inﬂation can fall. This result is proved in
the next proposition.
As before, under the assumption that the ﬁrst-order condition approach is valid we






subject to the constraints x = µ and (21).
Proposition 6. Under the assumption that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid, the optimal




   
   
vw if π ≤ πw
vb if π > πw

   
   
(29)
for some cutoﬀ inﬂation rate πw.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst-order con-
dition of the problem (28) with respect to w(π) implies that ww(π) has a bang-bang form
around some cutoﬀ πw. To show that ww(π) must be increasing, note that at the optimum
Rµ(xw,µ w) ≤ 0 so that current period payoﬀ for the government is decreased when the gov-




w(π)fµ (π|µ)dπ ≥ 0
28which gives the result that ww(π) is increasing. Q.E.D.
We use an argument similar to that in Proposition 2 to characterize the regions of the
parameter space. When the variance of domestic and foreign inﬂa t i o ns h o c k si st h es a m e ,
the worst payoﬀ under an exchange-rate regime is lower than that under a money regime,
that is, vw
e <v w
µ. This is because, in this case, the current period payoﬀ functions R and S
are the same and, under an exchange-rate regime, the incentive constraint is looser than it
is under a money regime. Hence, when these variances are the same, the worst equilibrium
payoﬀ vw =m a x {vw
e ,v w
µ} is equal to that under a money regime. Clearly, increasing the
variance of foreign inﬂation shocks above that of the domestic shocks reduces vw
e and leaves
vw
µ unchanged. Hence, vw = vw
µ when the variance of foreign inﬂation shocks exceeds that of
domestic inﬂation shocks.
We combine this result with that in Proposition 2 to characterize equilibrium outcomes
in Figure 2. If the variance of foreign shocks is suﬃciently high relative to that of domestic
s h o c k s ,a si nR e g i o nC ,t h e nt h eg o v e r n m e n tf o l l o w sam o n e yr e g i m ei nb o t ht h eb e s ta n d
the worst equilibrium. If the variance of foreign shocks is suﬃciently low relative to that of
domestic shocks, as in Region E, then the government follows an exchange-rate regime in
both the best and the worst equilibrium. When the variances of the two shocks are similar,
as in Region D, then the government uses an exchange-rate regime in the best equilibrium
and a money regime in the worst equilibrium.
In Regions D and E the observed outcome is a constant e in every period. The observed
outcome in Region C is more interesting. In this region a money regime is used in both the
best and worst equilibrium. In Figure 3 we illustrate a typical path of money growth and
inﬂation observed in the best equilibrium in periods 0 to 10. In period 0 agents choose low
29wages xµ = µb, the government chooses low money growth µb and realized inﬂa t i o ni st h i sl o w
money growth plus the domestic inﬂation shock π0 = µb + ε0. Since realized inﬂation π0 is
less than the critical value πb, in period 1 agents again choose wages xµ = µb, the government
chooses low money growth µb and realized inﬂation is π1 = µb + ε1. The outcomes continue
in this fashion, with agents choosing low wages and the government choosing low money
growth until the domestic inﬂation shock is large enough so that realized inﬂation exceeds
the critical value πb. In the ﬁgure this occurs in period 4. In period 5, agents choose high
wages xµ = µw, the government chooses high money growth rate µw and realized inﬂation
is π5 = µw + ε5. This pattern continues until the domestic inﬂation shock is high enough so
that realized inﬂation exceeds the high critical value πw. In the ﬁgure this occurs in period
7. In period 8, the outcome reverts back to the pattern of agents choosing low wages and
the government choosing low money growth. After that, the outcome cycles stochastically
between these two phases, depending on the realizations of the domestic inﬂation shocks.
6. Conclusion
Here we have considered the advantage of transparency in a model in which the ex-
change rate is observable and the money growth rate is only observable with noise, at least
contemporaneously. In the best equilibrium of the exchange-rate regime the rate of depreci-
ation of the exchange rate is constant. This occurs because our simple model abstracts from
all shocks that would lead the optimal mean inﬂation rate to vary over time. As such our
model does not provide a rationale for ﬁxed exchange rates, rather it provides a rationale for
using exchange rates as policy instruments rather than money growth rates.
This paper shows that a certain price, namely, the exchange rate, has an advantage over
30a certain quantity, namely, the money growth rate, as an instrument for monetary policy. This
basic idea that prices have an advantage over quantities as instruments of monetary policy
might also be applied to a comparison of interest rates and any other quantity instrument
that is more diﬃcult to monitor.
31Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1. In any period, given some wages xe, the government’s static
best response to xe is to choose e to maximize S(xe,e). This best response is given by
B(xe)=( U +xe)/2. Likewise, the static best response to xµ is B(xµ)=( U +xµ)/2, and the
static Nash outcomes are e = xe = U and µ = xµ = U. Repeating the static Nash outcomes
in every period, regardless of the history, is a perfect equilibrium that leads to a payoﬀ for
the government of
v
N =m a x [ S(U,U),R(U,U)].
Thus, vN ∈ V.
We now construct a higher equilibrium payoﬀ using the following trigger strategies.
Let ˆ e be some exchange rate that is strictly lower than the static Nash exchange rate U,
and let ˆ v = S(ˆ e,ˆ e) be the government’s payoﬀ when xe =ˆ e and this ˆ e is played in every
period. The trigger strategies specify the following. Begin with the government choosing an
exchange-rate regime, agents setting xe =ˆ e, and the government choosing ˆ e. Continue with
these actions in every period unless the government deviates from ˆ e. Following any such
deviation both the government and the private agents revert to the static Nash outcome.
These strategies constitute an equilibrium if the government has no incentive to deviate in
that
(1 − β)(S(ˆ e,B(ˆ e)) − S(ˆ e, ˆ e)) ≤ β(ˆ v − v
N) (30)
holds. It is easy to show with our functional forms that (30) is satisﬁed for ˆ e = U −ε for some
suﬃciently small ε. Thus, ˆ v and vN are equilibrium payoﬀs that satisfy vb ≥ ˆ v>v N ≥ vw.
Q.E.D.
32P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Here we show that the solution to the problem with incentive
constraint (12) is satisﬁed if and only if the ﬁrst-order condition (21) holds when σ2
π >
β
1−β(¯ w − w)
φ(1)
2 . Using (22), the constraint (12) can be written
µ ∈ argmax











Since F(πh,µ)=Φ((πh − µ)/σπ),w ec a nw r i t et h eﬁrst and second order conditions of the
maximization problem (31) as
(1 − β)Rµ(x
h,µ) − β






and for all µ
(1 − β)Rµµ(x







) ≤ 0 (33)
which can be written
−2(1 − β) − β
(¯ w − w)
σ2
π
φ(z)z ≤ 0 (34)
for all z ∈ [−∞,∞]. The expression φ(z)z in (34) is minimized at z = −1.S i n c eφ(−1) =
φ(1), the inequality σ2
π >
β
1−β(¯ w − w)
φ(1)
2 guarantees that the second order condition holds
globally, and thus (21) is both necessary and suﬃcient for (12). Q.E.D.
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35Figure 1:
Parameter regions for which exchange rate regime preferred
to money regime with and without commitment*
*With commitment, exchange rate regimes are preferred in region A, where the variance of
domestic inflation shocks is larger than the variance of foreign inflation shocks. With no
commitment, exchange rate regimes have an additional advantage. They are preferred in
both region A and in region B.
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Figure 3:  Outcomes when money regime
followed in best and worst equilibrium
money growth in worst inflation cutoff in worst
realized inflation
inflation cutoff in best
money growth in best